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HEURISTICS AND BIASES AT THE
BARGAINING TABLE
RUSSELL KOROBKIN* & CHRIS GUTHRIE**

I. INTRODUCTION

Negotiation is an inherently interpersonal activity that nonetheless
requires each participant to make individualjudgments and decisions. Each
negotiator must evaluate a proposed agreement, assess its value and the value
of alternative courses of action-such as continuing to negotiate or pursuing
an alternative transaction-and ultimately choose whether to accept or reject
the proposal.
The interdisciplinary field of "decision theory" offers both a normative
account (how should individuals act) and descriptive accounts (how do
individuals act) of decision making in the negotiation context. According to
the normative model, negotiators should compare the subjective expected
value of an agreement to the subjective expected value of non-agreement,
taking into account such factors as risks, differential transaction costs, and
reputational and relational consequences of each possible course of action.'
Once a negotiator has calculated the expected value of each course of action,
2
the negotiator should then select the one that promises the greatest return.
There is less agreement about whether negotiators actually make decisions

consistent with this approach. Proponents of descriptive or "positive" models
based on "rational choice theory"'3 assume that negotiators will invest

Professor of Law, UCLA.
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. The advice and comments of Carole Frampton, Michael
Moffit, and Andrea Schneider are gratefully acknowledged.
1. See, e.g., RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 43-50 (2002).
2. See, e.g., id. (proposing a "prescriptive approach" to calculating reservation prices); MAX H.
BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 1 (1992) ("Negotiating rationally
means making the best decisions to maximize your interests."). The normative approach, while
widely accepted, does have its detractors. See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast and
Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 5 (Gerd
Gigerenzer et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter SIMPLE HEURISTICS] (rejecting the standard normative
model of choice and proposing instead "our own vision of ecological rationality-rationality that is
defined by its fit with reality").
3. For an accessible account of rational choice theory in its various forms, see Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption
from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1060-66 (2000).
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optimally in the amount of information needed for decision making, draw
accurate inferences from the information they acquire, and then select the
option that maximizes their expected utility. In short, proponents of the
rational choice-based models assume that negotiators will make choices
consistent with the normative model.
Skeptics of rational choice-based models argue that negotiators rarely
behave this "demonically. ' 4 Instead, negotiators routinely employ more
intuitive approaches to judgment and choice that rely on a variety of
"heuristics" or mental shortcuts to reduce the complexity and effort involved
in the reasoning process. 5 While some researchers believe that negotiators
intentionally employ such heuristics to economize on the time and effort

4. Gigerenzer & Todd, supra note 2, at 5 (observing that "many models of rational inference
view the mind as if it were a supernatural being possessing demonic powers of reason, boundless
knowledge, and all of eternity with which to make decisions").
5. See Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychologyfor BehavioralEconomics,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1450 (2003); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the
"heuristics and biases" program into the literature on judgment and decision making. See, e.g.,
Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction-Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 1 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND
BIASES]. In their initial formulation, Tversky and Kahneman explained that "people rely on a limited
number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but
sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors." Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky &
Kahneman, Heuristics].
More recently, Kahneman and collaborator Shane Frederick have refined their explanation of
heuristic decision making as follows:
We will say that judgment is mediated by a heuristic when an individual assesses a
specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another property of that
object-the heuristic attribute-whichcomes more readily to mind ....Because the target
attribute and the heuristic attribute are different, the substitution of one for the other
inevitably introduces systematic biases.
Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in
Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra, at 53.
Rather than comparing the use of heuristic reasoning to rational choice analysis, Gerd
Gigerenzer and his colleagues at the ABC research group evaluate heuristic reasoning based on its
usefulness in solving problems in specific contexts. See generally SIMPLE HUERISTICS, supra note 2.
Scholars working in this research tradition focus on identifying heuristics with normative appeal in
certain situations. See Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, The Recognition Heuristic: How
Ignorance Makes Us Smart, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 2, at 37; Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel
G. Goldstein, Betting on One Good Reason: The Take the Best Heuristic, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS,
supra note 2, at 75. While scholars in the Tversky-Kahneman tradition tend to emphasize how
heuristics can lead decision makers astray, see SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 3, at 28, scholars in
the Gigerenzer tradition tend to emphasize how helpful heuristics can be, id, although this difference
in emphasis between approaches can be overstated. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics,
supra, at 1124 (observing that "[i]n general, these heuristics are quite useful").
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required to make decisions,6 others believe that reliance on heuristics is
unconscious. 7 In all likelihood, there is truth in both perspectives; that is,
negotiators rely on heuristics intuitively and unconsciously in some
circumstances and consciously employ heuristics in others. Either way,
negotiators should appreciate the important role that heuristics are likely to
play in their decision making-and in the decision making of their
counterparts-at the bargaining table.
In this essay, we examine the role of heuristics in negotiation from two
vantage points. First, we identify the way in which some common heuristics
are likely to influence the negotiator's decision making processes. Namely,
we discuss anchoring and adjustment, availability, self-serving evaluations,
framing, the status quo bias, contrast effects, and reactive devaluation.8
Understanding these common heuristics and how they can cause negotiators'
judgments and choices to deviate from the normative model can enable
negotiators to reorient their behavior so it more closely aligns with the
normative model or, alternatively, make an informed choice to take advantage
of the effort-conserving features of heuristics at the cost of the increased
precision that the normative approach offers. 9 Second, we explore how

6. See, e.g., Gilovich & Griffin, supra note 5, at 4 ("Heuristics have often been described as
something akin to strategies that people use deliberately in order to simplify judgmental tasks that
would otherwise be too difficult for the typical human mind to solve.").
7. Id. at 4-5 (observing that the "other way that heuristics have been described" is as "natural
assessments elicited by the task at hand that can influence judgment without being used deliberately
or strategically").
8. In their initial formulation, Tversky and Kahneman identified three basic heuristicsrepresentativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment.
See Tversky & Kahneman,
Heuristics, supra note 5. More recently, Kahneman and Frederick have argued that the three basic
heuristics are representativeness, availability, and the affect heuristic. See Kahneman & Frederick,
supra note 5, at 56 ("It has become evident that an affect heuristic should replace anchoring in the list
of major general-purpose heuristics."). But see Daniel T. Gilbert, Inferential Correction, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 5, at 167 (arguing that anchoring and adjustment "describes the
process by which the human mind does virtually all of its inferential work").
Nonetheless, most decision researchers use the terms "heuristics and biases" loosely to include
several mental shortcuts that decision makers are likely to make. See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES,
supra note 5 (containing articics describing several diffiefent pleuuniena',) Tve sky & Kahncma,
Heuristics, supra note 5. Likewise, in recent years, legal scholars have broadly defined heuristics
and biases when applying them to law. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain PsychologicalCase
for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1170-73 (2003) (observing that legal scholars have
focused primarily on representativeness, availability, hindsight bias, anchoring, and self-serving
bias). For applications of many different heuristics and biases to many different legal problems, see
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998);
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
DecisionMaking in Legal Scholarship:A LiteratureReview, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
9. Cf JOHN PAYNE ET AL., T-E ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER (1993) (describing decision
making behavior as a trade-off between accuracy and effort).
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negotiators might capitalize on the knowledge that their counterparts are
likely to rely on heuristics in their decision making processes. We consider,
in other words, how negotiators can exploit heuristic reasoning on the part of
others for personal gain.
II. UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIATOR JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
When deciding whether to accept or reject an actual or anticipated set of
deal terms, a negotiator must perform two cognitive tasks. First, the
negotiator must evaluate the content of the available options, a task we can
loosely call "judgment." For example, a negotiator contemplating the
purchase of a particular business must try to evaluate the market value of the
business's assets, determine what percentage of the business's current clients
will be retained in case of a change of ownership, estimate how much profit
the business will earn in the future, and evaluate the likelihood that the
negotiator would find a similar business to purchase if the negotiator opted
not to purchase this one. From this perspective, judgment tasks concern a
search for facts about the world.
Second, the negotiator must determine which available option he prefers,
a task we can call "choice." For example, would he rather purchase the
business under consideration for a specific price or reject such a deal in favor
of continuing his search, thus taking a chance that he will find an equally
desirable business at a lower price or a more desirable business at the same
price?
In performing both of these tasks-i.e., judgment and choice-the
negotiator should evaluate options and make decisions consistent with the
normative model of choice. However, both social science research and
common experience suggest the negotiator's decision making processes will
often depart from the normative model.
A. Judgment

Negotiators cannot know the objective values and probabilities of every
option they might consider before reaching a negotiated outcome. Thus, to
estimate the values and probabilities associated with each option, negotiators
are likely to rely on heuristics. Heuristics often enable negotiators to make
good judgments in a "fast and frugal"' 0 manner.'' On other occasions,
10. See generally SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 2, at 97.
11. See, e.g., Jean Czerlinski et al., How Good are Simple Heuristics, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS,
supra note 2, at 97 (comparing the success of the "take the best" heuristic to multiple regression
analysis in a number of judgment tasks); Jorg Reiskamp & Ulrich Hoffrage, When Do People Use
Simple Heuristicsand How Can We Tell, in SIMPLE HEURISTICS, supra note 2, at 141 (inferring the
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heuristics prove to be poor substitutes for more complex reasoning and result
in negotiator decisions that fail to best serve the negotiator's interests.
1. Anchoring and Adjustment
One heuristic approach to judgment tasks that can lead to suboptimal
results is known as "anchoring and adjustment." To estimate the value of an
option, negotiators are likely to start with the value of a known option, the
"anchor," and then adjust to compensate for relevant differences in the
2
character of the known and unknown item. 1
For example, a negotiator buying a business might estimate its future
profits by starting with the known profits recently earned by a similar business
and then adjusting his estimate based on the fact that the known business has
fewer current clients and higher labor costs than the subject of the negotiation.
Alternatively, the negotiator might base his estimate on the profits earned by
the business in question the previous year and then adjust his estimate of next
year's profits based on changing market conditions or the presence of new
competitors. Although adjusting from a known anchor is a useful approach to
making a judgment, experimental evidence indicates that people often fail to
adjust sufficiently away from the initial "anchor."'' 3 In other words,
negotiators who rely on this heuristic will often undervalue the differences
between the known and unknown values.
In addition, especially when numerical estimates are necessary,
individuals sometimes anchor on values that are largely, or even completely,
irrelevant. In one well-known example, subjects estimated that the average
annual temperature in San Francisco was higher after first being asked if it
was higher or lower than 558 degrees! 14 In an example more obviously
relevant to negotiation, we found that the opening offer in a litigation
settlement negotiation can affect the recipient's judgment of a subsequent
final offer 5even when the opening offer does not convey relavent
information.'
frequency that experimental subjects used simple heuristics in judgment tasks).
12.See Tversky & Kahneman,Heuristics, spra note 5.
13. There is some debate about whether anchoring effects are a product of insufficient
adjustment, see, e.g., Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring
and Adjustment Heuristic, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 391 (2001), or the availability of anchor-consistent
information, see, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant:
Anchors in Judgments ofBelief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 5, at 120, 130-33.
14. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING

146 (1993)

(referring to an unpublished study by George Quattrone and colleagues).
15. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A
Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 11-13, 18-19 (1994)
[hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers].
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Whether a negotiator bases a judgment on an appropriate anchor adjusted
insufficiently or bases the judgment on an inappropriate anchor, the resulting
judgment will often be less precise than the negotiator might have made given
the available information. Returning to our original hypothetical, depending
on the anchor consulted, the negotiator could make a suboptimal estimate of
the profits the target business is likely to achieve the next year.
2. Availability
When a negotiator's option could have a variety of consequences, each
probabalistic, rather than a single certain outcome-for example, if the
negotiator enters an agreement to buy the business under consideration, the
business might make a large profit or, alternatively, it might go bankrupt-the
negotiator will often evaluate the likelihood of the various possible outcomes
based on the ease with which the possible outcomes come to mind. Because
probabilistic judgments are based on how mentally available the possible
16
results are, this method of judgment is known as the "availability" heuristic.

Like anchoring and adjustment, basing judgments on the availability of
outcomes is a reasonable, time-saving device that will often yield acceptable
outcomes because availability is often correlated with frequency. But when
the available outcomes are not typical, or when there are important differences
between the past and future circumstances, the heuristic can lead to flawed
predictions. For example, a negotiator evaluating the prospects of entrusting
his or her lawsuit to a jury for the purpose of deciding whether to accept a
settlement offer might overestimate the likelihood of winning punitive
damages at trial if he recalls a recent multi-million dollar verdict in a tobacco
lawsuit publicized in the news, because
the media exposure afforded to that
7
typicality.1
its
reflect
not
does
verdict
3. Self-Serving Evaluations
Substantial evidence indicates that individuals are particularly likely to
make judgments concerning existing facts and future probabilities in ways
that confirm pre-existing belief structures,1 8 assume high degrees of personal
16. See Tversky & Kahneman, Heuristics, supra note 5.
17. The availability heuristic is quite similar to what is sometimes called the "salience" or
"vividness" heuristic. See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 8 (1980) (observing per the salience heuristic that

"people effectively assign inferential weight to physical and social data in proportion to the data's
salience and vividness").
18. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., BiasedAssimilation and Attitude Polarization:The Effects
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
2098, 2102 (1979) (finding that factual evidence about the death penalty reinforced the prior beliefs
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agency in the world, 19 and create a positive presentation of self.20 This
tendency will often result in judgments compromised by what is called the
"self-serving" or "egocentric" bias.2'
A plethora of studies demonstrate that individuals often judge uncertain
options as more likely to produce outcomes that are beneficial to them than an
objective analysis would yield.22 Depending on the specific context, the bias
could cause negotiators to overestimate either the likely benefits that would
result from reaching a negotiated agreement or the likely benefits that would
result from rejecting the proposed agreement and pursuing an alternate course
of action. In one study, for example, George Loewenstein and his colleagues
assigned some experimental subjects to the role of plaintiff and others to the
role of defendant and then asked each to judge the value of the lawsuit based
on the very same information.
Both plaintiff and defendant subjects
believed that a judge would be more likely to rule for their side should the
case go to trial, suggesting that, on average, subjects' judgments of the quality
of their non-agreement option (i.e., adjudication) were inflated relative to the
objective quality of that option.24
B. Choice
After judging the objective attributes of available options, negotiators
must eventually make a choice between them. Normative models assume that
negotiators will make choices based on a comparison of the expected values
of each option; the decision theory literature suggests that choices often fail to
reflect this reasoning process.

of subjects who both supported and opposed the policy).
19. See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 814 (1980) (finding increased, unfounded optimism when
subjects perceived the events at issue to be controllable).

20. Id.
2 1. -See,e.a, Michael Ron

& Finre Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution,

37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322 (1979).
22. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439,
441-43 (1993) (finding that recently married couples expect that they will not get divorced, despite
knowing the divorce rate); Ross & Sicoly, supra note 21, at 324-26 (finding that people overestimate
their relative contributions to conversations and their relative contribution to housework); Weinstein,
supra note 19, at 809-11 (finding that people routinely overestimate how healthy they are relative to
others).
23. See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993).
24. Id.
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1. Framing
When choosing between an option with a known outcome and one with an
uncertain outcome, research demonstrates that individuals often consider not
only the expected value of each choice, but also whether the possible
outcomes appear to be "gains" or "losses" relative to a reference point,
typically the status quo.25 In the standard case, individuals tend to exhibit risk
aversion when choosing between an option that promises a certain gain and
one that has a chance of resulting in a greater gain, but risk-seeking tendencies
when choosing between an option associated with a certain loss and one with
a probabilistic chance of a larger loss. 26 These findings suggest that if
agreement will generate a certain outcome (such as the settlement of a lawsuit
for a fixed sum of money) and non-agreement will leave the negotiator to
pursue a risky alternative (such as a trial with a probability of winning a large
sum and a probability of winning nothing), the negotiator's choice between
agreement and impasse could depend on whether her reference point for
evaluating the decision options is the status quo 27 or some other reference
point.28
2. The Status Quo Bias
All other things equal, individuals on average tend to prefer an option if it
is consistent with the status quo than if it requires a change from the status
quo.29 Often, we prefer the status quo because we receive more utility from
25. This observation is derived from Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's "prospect theory."
See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). For an accessible introduction to prospect theory and its
application to law, see Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1115 (2003).
26. See Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296 (1992).
27. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 113 (1996) (arguing plaintiffs should be risk averse because all scttlement offers should be
framed as gains). But see Chris Guthrie, FramingFrivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 163 (2000) (arguing based on prospect theory that plaintiffs in "frivolous" or "lowprobability" litigation are likely to be risk seeking rather than risk averse).
28. For example, she might use her pre-event position as a reference point. See Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental
Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers]
(demonstrating that plaintiffs could frame settlement as a loss if the settlement offer would not
restore them to the position they enjoyed prior to an accident). Alternatively, she might use some
expectation about what she deserves as a reference point. See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and
Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing that high negotiator aspirations can create riskseeking negotiating behavior).
29. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227,
1231-42 (2003) (reviewing empirical evidence of the effect).
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availability of the inferior pen substantially increased the likelihood that
subjects would choose the Cross pen over the $6. The implication is that a
negotiator's preference for one agreement possibility over another, or for a
proposed agreement over an outside alternative, might depend on whether
other options that make the proposed agreement appear desirable in contrast
are also considered as part of the calculus. 36
In some contexts, the presence of a third option, C, could logically affect a
decision maker's preference for A versus B, because C provides information
about the quality of A or B.3 7 But if C sheds no new light on A or B, its effect
on the A versus B decision would violate the normative model of choice. 38 As
Mark Kelman and his colleagues explain, an individual who prefers chicken
over pasta might rationally change her preference from pasta to chicken upon
learning that veal parmesan is on the menu because "the availability of veal
parmesan on the menu might [indicate] that the restaurant specializes in
Italian [food]." 39 But "[a] person who prefers chicken over pasta should not
change this preference on learning that fish is also available. 'AO
4. Reactive Devaluation
Finally, some evidence indicates that a negotiator's choice might depend
on the source of one or more options, even when that source provides no
information about the objective quality of the options. More simply stated, a
proposal can look less desirable than it otherwise would merely because a
counterpart offered it.
This phenomenon is known as "reactive
devaluation. ' '4 1
As a general rule of thumb, devaluing options proposed by a counterpart
whose interests are largely adverse to one's own will be useful in many
circumstances. For example, an agreement proposed by an adversary might
signal that the adversary has private information unknown to the recipient
35. Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrastand Extremeness
Aversion, 29 J.MARKETING RES. 281, 287 (1992).

16 See Chris Guhrie, Panoacea or Pandora's Box?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88
IOWA L. REV. 601, 617-19 (2003).
37. See, e.g., Simonson & Tversky, supra note 35, at 292 ("Context effects can sometimes be
justified normatively in terms of the information derived from the background or the local context.").
38. See, e.g., James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J.
CONSUMER RES. 187, 187 (1998) (observing that per the rational model of choice, "[e]ach option in a
choice set is assumed to have a utility, or subjective value, that depends only on the option").
39. Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
287, 287 n.2 (1996).
40. Id.at 287.
41. See, e.g., Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriersto Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION
J. 389, 392 (1991) (explaining reactive devaluation).
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the current state of affairs than we expect to receive from some other state
affairs, suggesting that the status quo bias is consistent with the normati
model of choice. In other circumstances, however, reliance on this heurisl
can lead decision makers to make choices that depart from the normati'
model. The status quo bias suggests that, all other things being equ
negotiators will prefer their initial endowments over endowments they mig
hope to receive through exchange, 30 that they will favor deal terms that a
consistent with legal default rules, 31 and that they will prefer
terms of tra4
32
issue.
at
is
that
bargain
of
type
the
for
conventional
are
that
As is true with framing, evidence of the status quo bias suggests th
negotiator choice can depend on the negotiator's particular perception of tl
status quo. Consider, for example, a customer whose car lease is about
expire and is considering the car dealer's offer to sell the car to him f
$10,000. The customer's choice between accepting the offer and rejecting tl
offer (and shopping elsewhere for transportation) could conceivably I
effected by whether the customer's perception of the status quo is (a) that I
leases rather than owns a car or (b) that he operates the leased car. Bol
descriptions of the world are factually accurate, yet the status quo bi;
suggests that focusing on the first would make the customer more likely
reject the dealer's proposal than focusing on the second.
3. Contrast Effects
Evidence also suggests that choice can depend on the full range of optio
available to the decision maker, even when the normative model suggests tl.
the availability of certain options should be irrelevant.
Researchc
investigating such "contrast effects" 33 have demonstrated, for example, tt
individuals are more likely to select an option in the presence of a simit
inferior option than in the absence of the inferior option.34 In one illustrati
experiment, Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky found that 28% m
subjects chose an elegant Cross pen when they were also offered 1
alternative choices of $6 in cash or an inferior pen than when subjects w,
offered only the choice between the Cross pen and the $6 in cash. That is,*

30. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et. al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect ana
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
31. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 1
608 (1998).
32. Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference: The Psychological Power of Default Rules
Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998).
33. See Joel Huber et al., Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violatior
Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 90 (1982).
34. Id.
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But in some circumstances
about the objective value of the agreement.
relying on this heuristic could cause a negotiator to reject a proposed
agreement in favor of pursuing an outside alternative when she would have
made precisely the opposite choice had the same proposal emanated from
another source.
III. INFLUENCING NEGOTIATOR JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
Negotiators who recognize that their counterparts are likely to rely on
heuristics when making the types of judgments and choices commonly
required in bargaining settings can use this knowledge to increase the
likelihood of securing agreements and of securing agreements on highly
favorable terms. This section briefly outlines some ways in which a
negotiator can make use of heuristic reasoning to influence her counterpart's
judgment and choice behavior. We use litigation bargaining anecdotes as
examples, but the concepts can be employed just as effectively in other
negotiation contexts.
A. Influence Through Anchoring
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic suggests that a negotiator can
affect her counterpart's judgment of the quality of a proposed agreement if
she can determine the content of the anchor. In commercial negotiations,
where monetary values are usually the bargaining currency, a monetary figure
that appears, even superficially, related to the subject of the negotiation can
affect one's counterpart's judgments.
In litigation bargaining, the settlement versus adjudication decision rests
in large part on the negotiator's judgment of what a court would award the
plaintiff should settlement negotiations fail. Because adjudication results are
notoriously difficult to predict, the plaintiffs lawyer has a clear opportunity to
improve his chances of convincing the defendant to choose settlement at a
favorable price over adjudication (and vice versa for the defendant's lawyer)
by manipulating the defendant's judgment of the adjudication option. Of
course, the plaintiffs lawyer might accomplish this by persuasive
argumentation. He might also accomplish this, however, by exposing the
defendant to a high anchor-perhaps by making a very high initial settlement
demand. Even if the defendant immediately rejects the high demand out of
hand, the demand could anchor the defendant's prediction of a jury verdict,
making that judgment higher than it otherwise would be, and thus increasing

42. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 28, at 150-60 (breaking the
concept of reactive devaluation into competing hypotheses).
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the likelihood that the defendant would choose a somewhat lower settlement
demand over the adjudication alternative.
Several pieces of experimental evidence support this contention.
Researchers have found, for instance, that those who open with an extreme
demand may be more likely to reach agreement; 43 that those who open with
extreme demands may be more likely to receive larger settlements; 44 and that
extreme demands are likely to influence mock jurors' assessments of the
value of a plaintiff s case.45
B. Influence Through Availability
Recall that the availability heuristic causes probability estimates of
outcomes to be effected by the mental availability of similar prior outcomes.
That an outcome's availability is not always highly correlated with its
frequency offers an opportunity for exploitation in bargaining. A negotiator
can increase the chances that her counterpart will accept a proposed
agreement favorable to the negotiator if the negotiator can increase the
availability in the counterpart's mind of outcomes that are favorable to the
negotiator and unfavorable to the counterpart.
As we identified in the context of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic,
the best opportunity to exploit the availability heuristic is when negotiation
decision making requires probabilistic judgments of highly uncertain events,
such as outcomes of adjudication. By drawing the defendant's attention to
large verdicts in recent cases that bear at least a surface similarity to the case
at hand, for example, the plaintiffs lawyer might increase the defendant's
prediction of the likelihood that a jury would return a large plaintiff's verdict.
This might, in turn, induce the defendant to accept a particular settlement
offer that he would otherwise reject.

43. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 15.
44. See Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role of
Perspective Taking and NegotiatorFocus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 657 (2001).

45. See Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 756
(1959); Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, The More You Get:
Anchoring in PersonalInjury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 526-27 (1996); Reid
Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff's Requests and Plaintiff's Identity
on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445, 463 (1999); Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin
E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC.

PSYCHOL. 991, 1009 (1995); John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping JurorAttitudes: Effects of
Requesting Different Damage Amounts in PersonalInjury Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 495
(1988); Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors'
Decision Making, 14 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 385, 393 (1990).
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HEURISTICS

C. Influence Through Framing
The framing effect suggests that a negotiator's choice between a certain
option, such as a litigation settlement agreement, and a probabilistic option,
such as adjudication, will depend in part on the reference point from which
she compares the two options. Assuming that the options have a similar
perceived expected value, she is more likely to choose the certain choice if the
options appear favorable (i.e., look like gains); if the options appear
unfavorable (i.e., look like losses), she is more likely to prefer the risky
choice.4 6 A negotiator can therefore increase the likelihood that her
counterpart will accept a settlement agreement proposal if she can cause the
counterpart to select a reference point that makes settlement look positive in
contrast.
Relative to the reference point of the current state of affairs, a litigation
settlement or a trial verdict would naturally appear to be gains from the
perspective of the plaintiff, who will receive compensation in either event,
and a loss for the defendant, who must pay in either event. From this
perspective, we would predict that a defendant is more likely to reject rather
than to accept a settlement proposal that is roughly equivalent to the expected
value of trial.47 A plaintiff who wishes to maximize the likelihood that the
defendant will accept such a proposal, or even one more favorable to the
plaintiff, can do so by attempting to provide a different reference point by
refraining the options.
Specifically, the plaintiff's lawyer might try to induce the defendant to
compare his available options not to the status quo, but to a different reference
point that will make those options seem more attractive. For example, she
might try to persuade him to compare his options to a realistic worst-case
outcome at trial. Relative to that reference point, the defendant's options are
likely to look like gains, which should prompt him to find paying the certain
settlement relatively more attractive. 48
D. Influence Through ContrastEffects
A negotiator familiar with contrast effects will recognize that her
46. See supra Part II.B. 1.
47. See Rachlinski, supra note 27. This simple analysis is meant only to illustrate the framing
issue, not to evaluate the full range of defendants' incentives. Thus, it assumes no transaction costs,
no issues involving the time value of money (i.e., the payout would occur at the same time in the
event of a trial or a settlement), no difference in reputational consequences between settlement and
trial, and no particular desire or reluctance to go to trial beyond the monetary consequences.
48. But see Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers,supra note 28, at 163 (arguing that
"the barrier to settlement created by negative frames is not ephemeral and might prove quite stubborn
and difficult to mitigate in real litigation situations").
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counterpart is likely to evaluate an option more favorably if a similar but
inferior option is available. 49 The negotiator may thus be able to increase the
likelihood that her counterpart will select a particular agreement proposal if a
similar but inferior proposal is offered in the alternative.
Suppose, for example, that a fired employee files suit against a company
for which she used to work, asserting employment discrimination claims
under Title VII. Suppose further that the defendant has offered to pay the
plaintiff a $30,000 cash payment to settle the case but that the plaintiff is
wavering because trial holds some appeal. Assuming that the defendant wants
the plaintiff to accept the $30,000 settlement offer, what might defense
counsel do to encourage her to accept it?
In lieu of the $30,000 lump sum payment, for example, defense counsel
might offer to donate $30,000 to the charity of the plaintiffs choice, offer
$30,000 in merchandise to the plaintiff, or offer to pay her $10,000 per year
for three years. Research on contrast effects suggests that the presence of any
of these alternative options should make the $30,000 cash offer seem more
attractive by comparison than it would appear standing alone. This, in turn,
should increase the likelihood that the plaintiff will choose to accept the
settlement proposal and forego trial.
IV. CONCLUSION

Negotiators often lack control over the identity of counterparts, the issues,
and the bargaining environment, but they do enjoy control over how they
make decisions.50 By understanding the decision making process, the
negotiator can exercise that control effectively and even exercise some control
over how her counterpart makes decisions as well.

49. See supra Part II.B.3.
50. BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 2, at 4.

